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Introduction
The present report has the objective to provide an overview of the general framework and particular dimensions of
the corporate governance in Bulgaria. It is published for the first time and the authors intend to continue its
publication on an annual basis. In its present form, the study contains information thus far unavailable to the
professional community and the media. The evaluations and analyses herein are the first attempt to outline the
achievements and the problems in the field of corporate governance in Bulgaria in the years of transition. The
authors of the report thus aim to encourage a wider discussion on the subject and that, as a result, practical
improvement action will be undertaken.
At the end of the past year the Corporate Governance Initiative conducted a pilot study for assessment of the
corporate governance in Bulgaria. It is a part of the activities under phase II of the project aiming at the elaboration
of recommendations for practical measures for improvement of the corporate governance, including diagnostics and
analysis of the existing corporate structures.
The survey was conducted by Vitosha Research and covered all listed companies with authorized capital over BGN
200,000. The sample comprised 268 companies, while the number of the surveys was 158. The research method
applied is a standard interview with representatives of the companies' managing bodies and senior management.
Based on the survey results, the first index of corporate governance in Bulgaria was calculated. The index has values
between 1 and 5, the lowest value of 1 indicating unfavorable legal and institutional frame and internal
organizational factors of the corporate governance, and the highest value of 5 - ideal conditions and good practice of
corporate governance.
The report has been prepared mainly on the basis of the results of the pilot study, compared and partially
supplemented by conclusions and assessments of other studies, publications in the press and international sources.
The report has been prepared by the following team: prof. Dr. Bistra Boeva, associate prof. Dr. Stefan Petranov, Dr.
Vesela Stancheva, senior research associate Plamen Chipev, Diana Hristosova - senior expert, Center for Economic
Development, Stoyu Nedin - Chairman of Association of shareholders, Dr. Maria Prohaska - coordinator, Corporate
Governance Initiative.
1. Legal and institutional framework of the corporate governance
This section of the report presents analysis of the regulatory and institutional environment for the corporate
governance development in Bulgaria, based on the results of the pilot study. These results comprise assessments of
the role of the judicial system, capital market development and efficiency of its institutions, and above all the extent
in which the existing legislative framework facilitates or constrains the development of corporate governance.
The index value for this section is 3.26. It is certainly a very positive and high assessment, attributed predominantly
to the high index values in the part of the regulatory framework. Most of the questions in this part received
assessments close to or exceeding 4.
Along with that, considerably lower are the assessments for the efficiency of the capital market institutions: the State
Securities Commission, the Bulgarian Stock Exchange in Sofia, and the Central Depository. It should be outlined
here that the assessment for each of the three institutions should be analyzed separately rather than in comparison
due to the substantial differences in their functions and tasks. They are grouped together under a generalized
question as long as their integrity and interrelation has an impact on the creation and functioning of a developed
capital market in Bulgaria.
Out of the three institutions constructing the capital market infrastructure - the State Securities Commission (SSC),
the Bulgarian Stock Exchange (BSE) and the Central Depository (CD), the Central Depository received the highest
assessment for efficient functioning. It is the only institution ranked above average (the average value is calculated
at 3.38), while the efficiency of the other two is assessed below the average value (2.83 for SSC and 2.55 for BSE).
The explanation relates mainly to the scope of activities and different responsibilities of the three institutions. The
Central Depository has an important, but to a certain degree predominantly technical, role in the capital market
functioning. This makes its work relatively easier compared to the role of the other two institutions. The relatively
high assessment for the Central Depository reflects both its proper functioning and the generally successful solution
of the problem related to the registration of holdings in listed companies in Bulgaria. The establishment of the
Central Depository and its functioning has facilitated secure transactions and eliminated numerous difficulties
experienced by other transition economies that did not have institutions of an analogous kind. This is obviously
appreciated by the respondents to the study.
The lower assessments for the efficiency of the other two institutions result both from the relatively higher
complexity of their responsibilities and from the specifics of the companies' perception of their public statute. The
responsibilities of these institutions have relatively higher complexity compared to the activities of the Central
Depository, are of larger scale, involve more complicated interaction with the market agents, and have relatively
higher requirements for resources, qualifications and experience. As a result their successful functioning is
materially more complex and is likely to suffer relative delays in time. It should be however noted, that the activities
of the State Securities Commission, which carry highest responsibility and complication, are nevertheless assessed
higher than the activity of the BSE.
On the other hand a very important factor for the institutions appraisal by the listed companies is their own
perception of the capital market. Due to the specifics of their genesis, presently a substantial part of the Bulgarian
listed companies is not interested in its public statute. These companies find no benefit in it, while complying with
the regulations entails costs in one or other form. Thus this statute is assumed as imposed and even temporary, as a
result of which they assess the activity of the institutions as not particularly efficient from their point of view.
Unsatisfactory are also the assessments of the objectivity and the activities of the judicial system in the corporate
governance part (ranging from 1.82 to 2.68). These assessments have been based on respondents' opinion for the
process time horizon and related expenses for the court settlement of disputes.
The larger part of the questions in this section aims to assess the presently effective regulatory framework in
Bulgaria in terms of existing environment for corporate governance development. It should be noted, however, that
such an approach has its natural limitations as the corporate governance development level depends on both the
availability of a good and modern regulatory framework, and, more important, the way in which it is applied. A
discrepancy arises in this context between the relatively high assessments under most of the survey questions in this
part, and the practically unanimous opinion among professional circles for the relatively low level of corporate
governance development in Bulgaria. The assessments for the regulatory framework were given in the highest
values of the range (close to 5, the highest possible assessment) among all other sections of the survey.
Several evaluations under the scope of particular questions of the pilot study are presented in more detail here. The
respondents assessed positively the regulatory framework in its part concerning shareholder rights. The currently
effective legislation /the Law on Public Offering of Securities - LPOS/ adequately provides for the exercising of the
shareholder voting rights, including through a representative, and a proportional share in the company's earnings in
the cases when dividend pay-out is resolved.
There are certain divergences of opinion in the assessment of the quality of the regulatory framework concerning the
prevention of insider information misuse. In that aspect the LPOS strictly follows the European standards. The
restrictions envisaged for insiders provide for the equitable treatment of shareholders in respect to their access to
information.
The divergence in the responses most probably relates to the efficiency levels of the practical enforcement of the
restriction envisaged in the law. In that aspect indeed there is much to be desired, moreover that revealing the misuse
of insider information by definition entails a factual and legal difficulty. This relates to the issue of the further
enhancement of the securities market institutions - the Bulgarian Stock Exchange in Sofia, the Central Depository
and the State Securities Commission, and particularly the implementation of efficient procedures for securities, trade
monitoring and supervision in order to provide timely and efficient detection of the cases when the regulations have
been violated concerning insiders and insider information.
A high assessment is given also to the quality of the regulatory framework in terms of exercising control over
conflicts of interest, including the cases of property handling and transactions with related parties. Indeed, the LPOS
envisage that the managing body of a listed company may not execute without the explicit consent of the general
meeting any transactions that would lead to the transfer of ownership or other rights over assets that exceed fifty
percent of the value of the total company assets as accounted on its books. Furthermore, the general meeting can
approve such resolution with a majority of three quarters of the capital present, if at least three quarters of the
authorized stock is present or represented at the meeting, and under the conditions of a descending quorum - at least
a half of the capital. This regulation is limited, however, to transactions with property handling. Besides, the
relatively recent introduction of the regulation is still a reason for the lack of any practice whatsoever on its
enforcement. The violations under this rule are merely sanctioned with administrative-penal liability of fines from
BGN 2,000 to BGN 10,000 (in case the deed does not represent a crime), but so far no sanctions have been enforced.
On the other hand, transactions between related parties are not regulated at all by the legislation on the listed
companies and are not subject to any control. The same applies to the conflicts of interests. The only regulation
concerning conflicts of interests is included in the Commercial act and relates to the exercise of the voting right at
the general shareholders' meeting. According to that regulation, a shareholder or its representative cannot participate
in the voting of resolutions for:
1. filing claims against him/her;
2. initiating actions for enforcing his/her liability to the company.
The study attempts to assess the legislative framework in terms of providing the objective evaluation of the board of
the corporate activities, independent of the executive position. Such legal possibility and, moreover, such practice
are a definitive sign for good corporate governance. In this aspect, the assessment in the study is high (3.59), but it
should not be accepted without any reservations and is most probably due to the lack of understanding on the part of
the respondents. Generally, the Bulgarian legislative framework neither requires the inclusion on the board of the so-
called outside directors, nor concerns the internal distribution of the functions between the board members. In fact,
in some companies a part of the board members are outsiders for that company (i.e. they are not employees of the
company), but in most cases they are representatives of persons related to the company or the controlling
shareholder and therefore they do not satisfy the requirement of independence in the sense of the international
papers on corporate governance. Besides, there are no specific rules or procedures enacted to guarantee such
independent evaluation. Whenever some companies are doing this, it is on a purely voluntary basis. Therefore, it
cannot be asserted that the legal framework guarantees the board's objective evaluation for the corporate activities,
independently of the executive position.
Similarly, it cannot be asserted to the extent revealed by the results of the study, that the legal framework guarantees
the implementation of the board's functions related to the preparation of the company's strategy, action plans, annual
budgets and business plans. The revue of the legal framework shows that the board's functions and powers are not
subject of regulation, except in most general aspects. The legal framework even does not oblige the company to
approve such documents as company strategy, action plans, annual budgets and business plans, and even lesser
indicates which body is empowered to approve such acts. Whenever such documents are discussed in some
companies, this is done on the basis of internal company documents, such as the Articles of Association.
2. Organizational internal factors of the corporate governance
This section focuses on evaluation and analysis of three key corporate governance fields: the equitable treatment of
minority shareholders, the members and functioning of the managing bodies, and the disclosure of information. The
general index has the value of 3.11. The assessment should be considered in the context of the research method
applied and the objective development of corporate governance in Bulgaria.
2.1. Equitable treatment of shareholders and protection of the minority shareholder rights
The attempt to create an index providing a measure of the corporate governance development level necessitates the
inclusion of the issues concerning the equitable treatment and protection of minority shareholders. To a certain
extent these questions represent the essence of the corporate control as, by definition, in the environment of
separation of ownership and control, the corporate governance is intended to provide submergence of the managers'
activities to the shareholders interests. In Bulgaria, which is characterized by a significant concentration of
ownership in the listed companies with managers practically identifiable with the controlling shareholders, the
corporate control problem is projected into a problem of protection of the minority shareholders interest to that of
the controlling shareholders.
When determining the role and the participation of the minority shareholders, numerous formal and informal issues
are interrelated. The present research is predominantly directed to the formal aspect - how frequently the capital is
increased in divergence of the pro rata principle, are there cases of legal action undertaken etc., but it also provides a
number of interesting informal evaluations as the issue of the minority shareholders activism or their representation
in the managing bodies.
The research results with direct relation to the evaluation of the minority shareholders' protection have definitely an
unearthing value despite the fact that the pilot nature of the study has imposed certain limitations. The responses
reflect with a high degree of exactness the situation in this issue. Above all, the set of questions for the equitable
treatment of minority shareholders and protection of their rights has lowest value - 2.42 among all other sections.
Further, it is the only section indexed below the average possible value of 3.00. This means that within all
components of the corporate governance study, the direct evaluation of the equitable treatment of minority
shareholders is lowest. A major influence has the low assessment for the minority shareholders representation in the
managing bodies with value of 2.08. Closely two thirds of the interviewed representatives of listed companies have
stated that minority shareholders are either inadequately represented or not represented at all.
The low result can be interpreted in two directions. On one hand, it is induced by the suppressed minority
shareholders activism in the election of the board members, which could be affected by either their amorphous
structure or the objective impotence to influence the nomination process, regardless of the willingness and attempts
for concerted action, resulting from their restrained access to the nomination procedures and to the general meetings
for shareholders. From a different perspective, it also reveals the level of board identification with the interest of the
minority shareholders. Since, after all, a nominated by the minority shareholders board member, with his or her
passiveness, incompetence and lack of interest, could be far less efficient in following the corporate governance
principles and protecting the interest of the nominating shareholders, than board members, nominated by the largest
(or controlling) shareholders solely, which however protect on best efforts the rights of all shareholders
Similar meanings have the responds concerning weak minority shareholder activism in relation to discussing the
strategic directions for the company's activity and decision-making by the general meeting - 58% of the respondents
assess it below the average level of activism, which in combination with the 22% that assessed it at the average
level, draws a very impressive picture if inadequate activism. A certain role for the low index value for minority
shareholders protection have also the responses concerning proxy voting - the few cases of such voting and the
predominantly low assessment for the minority shareholders activism. The evaluations on both issues have close
values - 2.31 and 2.45.
The above problem is of paramount importance despite that the LPOS regulates proxy voting quite
comprehensively. This regulation is prevailingly directed to the limitation of the improper use of proxy voting and is
restrictive in nature, e.g. the requirement for an explicit power of attorney with fixed contents. At the same time it
leaves untouched the problem for the broader involvement of investment companies and especially banks in the
accumulation of minority shareholders' votes and the active voting on their behalf.
It should not be overlooked, that the above issues vastly depend on the shareholder culture and the activism of the
shareholders themselves, and not merely on the adopted internal corporate documentation and practice. This drags
on the conclusion for the necessity of continuous practical measures directed to increasing of the shareholder culture
in Bulgaria in terms of corporate governance issues and the specific shareholder rights.
The issue concerning the minority shareholders rights is most condensly highlighted by the responses to the
question: "Does your company have an investor relations department?" Positive responses are not reaching even
20%, and even those should be addresses with a certain dose of skepticism. A certain portion of the respondents are
likely to have meant investor relations departments that often have very limited scope of duties. Some responses
contain explanations that experts from different departments or the chief accountant, financial officer, or legal
advisors respond to inquiries upon the resolution of the executive director. Considering that by virtue of the revoked
Securities, Stock Exchanges and Investment Companies Act, companies with more than 50 shareholders were
deemed public, and particularly in this case these are companies from the real sector and former privatization funds
that took part in the first wave of the mass privatization, and that have significantly more than 50 shareholders, it is
obvious there is a lack of an efficient mechanism for maintaining relations with minority shareholders and providing
a timely supply of the necessary information to interested parties.
Capital increases in divergence of the proportional participation principle are a classic example of violation of the
minority shareholder rights. The question whether the company's capital has been increased in divergence of the
proportional participation principle has been answered by 129 companies and 27 former privatization funds, namely:
positively - 14 companies (11%) and 1 former privatization fund (4%); negatively - 98 companies and 26 former
privatization funds; the board representatives of 17 companies did not know. The next question - how many times
has the capital been increased in divergence of the proportional participation principle, directed to those who
answered positively to the above question, 12 companies and 1 former privatization fund indicated once, 2
companies - twice, and the representative of 1 company answered that he does not know how many times exactly
the capital has been increased in divergence of the proportional participation principle.
The clearest positive part in the protection of the minority shareholder rights has had the discontinuation of the
practice for non-proportional capital increases, which is a merit of the LPOS. The same proposal was among the
measures for improvement of the corporate governance in Bulgaria, developed by the Initiative for Corporate
Governance in its Action Plan. Capital increases are one of the "narrow" issues, which even in a well functioning
economy present a real threat to minority shareholders, the least in respect of the "dilution" of their interests. In this
sense, the limitation of the capital increase cases in divergence of the proportional participation principle is an
important step towards greater respect of their rights, although not solving all "narrow" issues that still exist in this
process.
Along with the possibility given by the new LPOS, in force since February 2000, to delist the companies with
capital less than BGN 200,000 upon on a resolution of the general shareholders meeting from the registrar of the
publicly traded companies ("delisting") - a possibility that numerous companies and former privatization funds have
taken and continue to take advantage of, the non-proportional capital increase is the most striking example of bad
corporate governance, moreover regulated in the legislation in force. These two possibilities have an extremely
adverse effect on the ongoing second wave of the mass voucher privatization, as well as on the development of the
capital market in Bulgaria, because of the investors' uncertainty for the efficient protection of their interests,
resulting in low liquidity of the shares acquired. They restrict the possibilities for the pension funds to participate in
the voucher privatization and in the trade on the stock exchange, as these institutional investors are minority
shareholders in the company's capital and their interests are equally exposed as the interests of the individual
investors.
If summarized, the survey results in the present part clearly reveal the still weak protection of the minority
shareholders, the possibility for violation of their rights or more specifically their factual inability to exercise their
rights, which above affects the level of their activism and resultantly the entire investment process in Bulgaria.
There are also several other aspects of the minority shareholder rights, which did not find a place in the present
survey. First of all is the right of dividend - it is not a secret that a large number of the listed companies are not
taking an endeavor to fix any relation between financial results and dividend policy. This is the major impediment
for an efficient interest on behalf of portfolio investors. In the corporate control theory the issue is not among the
most discussed problems all long as in many cases the shareholder interest is adequately protected by capital gains.
This is not however the case of our economy in which the vicious circle of the lack of dividend, lack of liquid
market, lack of capital gains and in addition the existence of transfer pricing for draining of the companies, does not
allow the dividend policy issue to be overlooked. Despite the significant complexity of this issue, it would be viable
to consider incentives for the companies towards a more liberal dividend policy. In the first place such measure
could be provising an equal tax regime for dividends and income from government securities and bank account
interest, i.e. elimination of the 15% profit taxation, but probably other measures will also have to be enacted.
2.2. Board Composition and Functioning
It is accepted in the global theory and practice to consider the board of publicly traded companies as the symbol of
corporate governance. A predominant number of researches point out into prime importance the issues of the
managing bodies. In the theory and in the practice, the evolution in the methods of research and the practical
development of these bodies is clearly outlined. The interest on these issues is not merely from a legal point of view.
More and more economic and management problems are considered in relation to their composition and
functioning. This is of material importance for the Bulgarian research and practice on the issues concerning the
listed companies' managing bodies and corporate governance. The predominant interdisciplinary method in the
theory and practice should be also present in the Bulgarian environment.
The second point of peak importance in the rationalization of the modern tendencies is the explicit relation between
the issues of the composition of the managing bodies and the effect of the "principal-agent" institution functioning.
In the Bulgarian practice the issue of the managing bodies and their composition is still not considered in its
systematic relation, as with the principles of corporate governance.
Generally, the assessment for the board composition and functioning has the highest aggregated value (3.47) in
relation to the other issues of the pilot study. This value is substantially above the average (3.00), as are also six of
its nine components, while the other three are very close to it. This fact demonstrates that all aspects included in the
study concerning the board composition and functioning are valued relatively high individually and in comparison to
the aspects of corporate governance, examined in the different blocks of the study.
This assessment should be considered in the context of the study. As far as it has been conducted among the
members of the listed companies boards or in some cases among people involved in the management structures of
the companies, it is possible that some overvaluation has taken place as a result of the "self-evaluation effect".
In this block relatively high is the assessment for the aspects of board functioning, related to the qualification of its
members, the exercise of shareholder control and the differentiation of the authorities and the responsibilities among
the members. Relatively low is the assessment for the practice of the board on cooperating with external experts, the
binding of the board with the shareholder participation, the control of the board by the specialized internal
committees and procedures. The low assessment for the last two aspects of the board functioning is another empiric
confirmation of the observations and conclusions made in other studies on these problems.
Definitive for the managing bodies of a listed company is the level of the protection they provide to the principal
interests. The effect of the actions of each managing body depends on how the interests of the shareholders are
represented and protected. In the specific case of the Bulgarian publicly traded companies, the assessment on
whether the board members representing the shareholders interests effectively control the managers activities, is the
second highest out of the nine components in that part of the study and is lower only than the assessment for the
board members qualifications. Such an assessment is objective and can be explained by the structure of the property
in the listed companies. The presently dominating model in the publicly traded companies in Bulgaria shows a high
concentration of the property and a tendency to involve in one way or another the controlling shareholders in the
company management. Therefore, it is natural that the board effectively controls the management of the company
and that there are no impressive "principal-agent" problem at this time.
This high assessment however should be considered rather in general as an effective control by the shareholders. As
for the minority shareholders' effective control and representation, the assessment should be considered in the
context of section 2.1. In that section in the same aspect, but considered from the point of view of the minority
shareholders, obtained much lower assessment (2.42 for the block). The results of the study in this part are not
homogenous, i.e. there is a significant dispersion in relation to the extent of the protection of the minority
shareholders' interests. The fact that 42% of the answers reveal a low level of protection and representation of the
shareholders interests means that in Bulgaria the institution of the "agent" still does not operate effectively.
Frequently, the board members are rather managers than directors (in the sense of corporate governance). Further
efforts should be focused in that direction for the establishment of the good practice of corporate governance in
Bulgaria.
With a relatively high value is indexed the separation of authorities and responsibilities within the board. In almost
half of the cases such a separation can be observed and in a quarter of these the separation is described to be in "a
large extent". Certainly, this is a positive fact, as the existence of such separation is one of the substantial elements
of the good practice in corporate governance. Along with that, the answers to this question are rather non-
concentrated and in many cases (around 30%) this practice vaguely exists or is unavailable.
The lowest assessment in this block received the collaboration of the board with outside experts (2.79). Merely in
one quarter of the respondent companies the board collaborates intensively with outside specialists, who by their
expertise assist the process of taking management decisions. In many companies the managing bodies use the
services of outside experts rather rarely, and 10% of the respondent companies do not use such at all. This fact
testifies the possibility that in some cases the managing bodies do not take well-informed decisions and therefore
miss opportunities for their respective companies. But the fact is becoming increasingly important in the context of
the present specific concrete composition of the managing bodies in Bulgaria. As a result of the specifics of their
genesis, the managing boards of the Bulgarian listed companies frequently have inhomogeneous composition, and
some of the members have poor experience in the respective sector. Therefore, it can be expected that involving
outside experts in the activities of the managing bodies can generally contribute for a better management of the
companies. Still, such a practice is uncommon and the explanation of that fact can be found in two directions. The
first direction is the unwillingness of the firms to disclose information to outsiders (excessive of the legally imposed
requirements), even if these outsiders are consultants. The other direction is the poor development of the
consultancy services market.
Bordering on the average (2.99) is the assessment for the outside directors. The analysis of the answers shows that
most cases can be grouped around the average value (3.00) and almost symmetrically around it. That fact points out
the significant heterogeneity in the practice of individual companies. In a large number of them the participation and
the role of the outside directors in the managing bodies is considerable and is evaluated as efficient. But in another
broad number of the companies, the work of those directors is considered to be inefficient. Obviously in those
companies the benefit of their participation in the management is not clearly perceived or these directors do not
understand their functions personally. It is also obvious that the specific controlling role of the outside directors in
these companies over the inside directors and the management are not well understood.
The results of the pilot study confirm the conclusion that in Bulgaria the institution of the outside directors is not yet
established. There are no clear and strict criteria for an outside director and their role, as a part of the "checks and
balances" system is not fully understood. In many cases they have a formal political role. Additional information on
the effect of this institution is provided by the data on the cross-participation: the requirements for non-participation
in the managing bodies of more than one listed company are still not in force. Only a third of the respondents have
formulated requirements to the directors for that participation. The outlined aspects of the outside directors' activities
give reasons to recommend to direct in future a more significant part of the promotional activities to the outside
directors - their status, regulation, promotion and education.
A positive trend in the principal-agent relations represents the ascertained separation of the positions chairman of the
board and executive director. In the Bulgarian listed companies this is a dominating tendency with positive
consequences expected in connection with the institution of the agent and the principal-agent relation.
The separation of the board chairman and executive director positions is the practice of a considerable number of the
respondent companies (over 82%). This is a positive fact, as it guarantees the partition of functions and
responsibilities, as well as a more efficient organization of the work of the managing body itself. This formulation
corresponds to the spirit of the international experience and recommendations for good corporate governance.
Unfortunately, the comparison between this and previous analyses and conclusions, gives us the reason to believe
that this separation still has a rather formal character. When evaluated in the light of the global practice, these
conclusions and results should not be considered as dramatic - this separation is not always effective in the listed
companies even in the countries with developed corporate governance. The separation should be considered
positive, although the practical results can be expected after the accumulation of experience and after the
implementation of adequate educational initiatives.
The motivation of the board members is a problem repeatedly studied by the modern theory and practice. The
picture in Bulgaria is pronouncedly diverging from the global tendencies.
The assessment for the board members and the managing teams remuneration dependence on the companies'
financial results is relatively high (average of 3.37). In slightly over a half of the companies this dependence is
clearly outlined. For the rest it is vague, and in 17% of the companies such practice does not exist. In other words,
the practice on that issue is heterogeneous as well. Many companies have accepted this motivation mechanism, but
also many companies do not apply it. For the second category this fact could represent either a management
problem, caused by the lack of understanding of the motivation mechanisms, or the existence of motivation
mechanisms of another nature.
In this context board remuneration issues should be considered, such as the use of management & employee stock
option plans. With a few exceptions the practice is not applied. It exists in only 3.2% of the cases for the managing
bodies and 1.3% for the employees. A discrepancy can be observed here between the practice of stimulating the
board members through relating their remuneration to the company's results, on the one hand, and the possible
realization of this practice through the company stock on the other. The latter would be the most natural motivation
mechanism, which is also widely applied in the international practice. The reason for that discrepancy can be found
in the legal difficulties for remuneration in the form of shares, as well as in the low liquidity of the Bulgarian capital
market.
Along with that, some attention should be paid to the social and economic climate in Bulgaria as a whole. The total
lack of stock compensation is a reason for concern. Only three percent of the respondents answered that they follow
that principle. In Bulgaria's case the specifics are multiple: deviation from the global practice, lack of connection
between directorship and ownership, lack of effective principal-agent relations and last but not least deviation from
the principle and the aim to work in the interest of the shareholder. This issue should be analysed from now on and
evaluated in future. Other studies show that even the big international companies privatizing Bulgarian listed
companies do not follow these corporate governance principles in respect to the company managing bodies. And this
reveals a paradox - the parent companies follow these principles in the countries having developed capital markets
and corporate governance, but underestimate them in the transition economies.
The effectiveness of the internal procedures for revelation and avoidance of conflicts of interests is indexed above
the average (average value of 3.28). But this index includes only the companies where such procedures exist.
Actually, a large number of the companies (29.9%) do not have procedures for avoidance of conflicts of interests at
all. And the evaluation of the general picture requires taking into account the situation in all of the companies. After
adjusting the average value by the part of the companies not having procedures for the revelation and avoidance of
conflicts of interests, the assessment falls to 2.68, which would be the lowest value in this block. This can be
considered as a more accurate value for the efficiency of these procedures, as a lot of evidence has been already
accumulated that the conflict of interests represents a main problem for many listed companies in Bulgaria.
This fact reveals the necessity to undertake concrete measures for clarification of the type of conflict. Along with
that, it can be easily foreseen, that part of the problems would be solved after the introduction - by law or by self-
regulated organizations, of requirements for widening the scope of the information disclosed by the board members
in relation to their material interests in the listed companies they head. The global practice in this field is categorical.
To the opposite - the Bulgarian practice is far from perfect to the disadvantage of the shareholders. This is exactly
the objective for the work for improvement of the corporate governance practice in Bulgaria.
The effectiveness assessment for the internal corporate rules and procedures for corporate governance should be
interpreted in a similar way to the assessment for the efficiency of the internal procedures for revelation and
avoidance of conflicts of interests. Many companies (21.7%) do not have such procedures. If the average value of
the assessment for the companies, where such procedures exist, were adjusted, the total value for all companies of
the sample would have the average value of 2.79. Such relatively low value gives a more realistic idea on the
efficiency of the internal corporate rules and procedures. At the same time, these rules and procedures are perceived
to be, although by little, still more effective than the rules for revelation and avoidance of conflicts of interests.
Internal corporate rules and procedures exist in more companies than the rules for revelation and avoidance of
conflicts of interests.
The vast majority of the listed companies (75.8%) do not have auxiliary committees at their managing bodies.
Where such committees exist, the assessment for their efficiency is relatively low (average value of 2.94).
Obviously, at this stage the good practice of corporate governance involving the functioning of such committees is
not frequent and in use in Bulgaria. This might be due to the fact that the shareholders are not familiar with it or that
the interested shareholders cannot impose it to the board. The second hypothesis is referring to the dominating
model of ownership structure.
The assessment for the level of the requirements applied to the board members represents a separate homogenous
block. According to the answers of the study, the requirements at the appointment of the board members are
relatively high. The most important requirement is the educational census (average value of 4.55) and the least
important is the non-commitment to other companies through participation in their managing bodies (average value
of 3.46). The distribution of the assessments for the block has a similar profile showing the lack of asymmetry and
grouping to a large scale around the assessment that the stated requirements are applied to a large extent.
Unfortunately, the practice often demonstrates that the principles of the corporate governance in this aspect are only
formally applied. In this case the matter in hand is the content of these requirements.
The general assessment for the managing bodies should take into consideration the fact that the one-level structure is
dominating: 66% of the respondents have one-level system. The additional studies show that the one-level system is
typical for the listed companies in the real sector and the two-level - for the holding structures. This is not just a
legal issue but also an issue for the sense of the corporate governance and the institution of holdings and deserves
separate research and respective proposals.
2.3. Disclosure of Information
The pilot study of the corporate development in Bulgaria had the objective to evaluate and analyze the legal and
regulatory framework and practice relating to the disclosure of information. The results reveal relatively high
assessments in both sections, which however imposes the necessity for some additional clarifications. The
respondents evaluated the regulatory framework with an index of 4.13 as adequate to secure the shareholders right
of regular and up-to-date information for the company in which they have securities holdings.
Considering the rulings of the LPOS for mandatory filing into SSC of the annual, semi-annual and quarterly
financial reports of the companies and for disclosure of the so called "material information", the respondents'
evaluation reflects accurately the actual conditions in relation to the requirements set by the regulatory framework.
A high assessment is also given to the practical application of the rulings related to the disclosure of information in
terms of annual, semi-annual and quarterly financial statements - 4.60. This reveals that the self-evaluation of the
large number of listed companies is related to meeting the requirements for periodical disclosure of information. It is
a different question for the quality of these filings and the extent in which they comply with the requirements of the
LPOS in terms of contents and exhaustiveness. In any case however the companies have high self-evaluation for the
exhaustiveness and accessibility of the information disclosed - 3.87 and 3.80 respectively. Concerning accessibility,
the self-assessment is relatively fair as long as the regulatory framework contains explicit requirements in that aspect
and the compliance with it is guarded by the SSC.
A notable development is the respondents' strengthened understanding of the necessity the listed companies to
provide and disseminate in addition to the required by the LPOS standardized and timely information, and more
particular the company's financial statements, resolutions of the general meeting, the management's discussion and
analysis for the annual operations and results, etc. Probably it is considered that the information for the specific
issues listed above should be made accessible through the use of modern methods, in addition to the explicitly
prescribed by the LPOS, like Internet for instance. Such an understanding is certainly welcome, as long as practical
steps are undertaken in that aspect.
The availability and accessibility of information are by far the soundest protection of the minority shareholders
rights. In that relation noteworthy is the relatively high average assessment under the questions included the
Disclosure of Information block - 3.43. At first sight such an assessment runs into an inconsistency with the low
average evaluation of the minority shareholders rights protection. The result is however explicable with the fact that
the factors included in the disclosure of information section concern exclusively trailing information that covers
decisions already taken, reports and assessments, but not the method of organization and conduction of the general
meeting itself. Comparing these assessments with the relatively high evaluation of the legislatively provisioned right
of the shareholders of regular and up-to-date information on the company whose securities they hold - 4.60, the
interpretation of the results could go in the direction of the somewhat formal disclosure of information aiming to
"comply with the words of the law", whose volume and content is not sufficient for a more profound analysis of the
company's current performance and the quality of its management. Despite the relatively high assessment for the
accessibility and sufficiency of the disclosed information as well as for its compliance to the international standards
- 3.80, 3.87 and 3.84 respectively, the doubts for formalism cannot be excluded, as the questionnaires were filled by
the board members who have a direct influence on the type and content of the information disclosed, so that their
assessment would not necessarily correspond to that of the minority shareholders who are the consumers of that
information. And the conduct of the minority shareholders could be considered also as a "reaction in response" to
the quality and the sufficiency of the information disclosed as the inadequately informed holders of securities are
unable to take active and competent strategic decisions for the future of the company at the general meeting. In
connection with the above lies the explanation of the divergence in the assessment for the compliance to the legal
requirements for disclosure of information - 4.60 - that is substantially higher than the assessment for the quality and
timeliness of the information disclosed.
Conclusion
The Corporate Governance Assessment Report for Bulgaria does not claim comprehensiveness. It is an attempt to
present in a general forms the main characteristics and problems of the Corporate Governance, based on data from
the pilot survey. As a whole the results show the existence of trends, which follow the global ones and trends, which
reflect the transition's distinctiveness. There is still a diversion between the norm and the concrete content, the
requirements of the law and their implementation.
Some of the more important tendencies for improvement of the Bulgarian Corporate Governance practice are shown
in it, as well. The report will be ground for active and informative professional debate on these issues, but it will also
be a starting point for undertaking the necessary practical steps, in order for Bulgaria to get closer to the modern
standards and to become more attractive place for investments.
